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How the Seizure of Counterfeit Goods Can Go Bad: 






In 1984 Congress amended the Lanham Act to allow for the 
seizure of counterfeit goods.1  This was part of a larger anti-
counterfeiting act2 that also created criminal penalties for 
certain types of counterfeiting,3 and provided for treble damages 
in cases of civil counterfeiting.4  This was needed, according to 
the legislative history, to stem a growing business in piracy of 
legitimate goods.5  Prior to that, it was possible, though seldom 
successful, for trademark owners to seize goods under Rule 65 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.6  Since then, practitioners 
have taken the seizure remedy for granted in the fight against 
counterfeiters.7 
Often forgotten, however, is that a seizure can be obtained 
 
        * Michael Coblenz is an associate in the intellectual property section of 
Gardere Wynne Sewell, LLP in Houston, Texas.  He received his J.D. from 
Gonzaga University School of Law in 1994, and an LL.M. in Intellectual 
Property Law from the University of Houston Law Center in 1998.  He 
participated in Waco International v. KHK Scaffolding, et. al. as an associate 
with Royston Rayzor Vickery & Williams, LLP.    
 1. See 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) (2000). 
 2. THE TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING ACT OF 1984, Pub.L.No. 98-473, 98 
Stat.2178 (1984).  This was part of the omnibus Crime Control Act of 1984. 
 3. See 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2001). 
 4. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b) (2000). 
 5. See Joint Statement on Trademark Counterfeiting Legislation, 130 
CONG. REC. 31673 (1984); S. REP. NO. 98-526, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3627.  The Senate Report accompanied the original version of the bill that 
added the criminal counterfeiting provisions, 18 U.S.C. § 2320.  As originally 
proposed, this bill included the ex parte seizure provision now found at 15 
U.S.C. § 1116(d), within the criminal provision.  The two provisions were 
separated in the Joint Conference Committee. 
 6. See, e.g., In re Vuitton, et Fils S.A., 606 F.2d 1 (2nd Cir. 1979). 
 7. See, e.g., TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING 5-16 (George W. Abbott, Jr., 
and Lee S. Sporn, eds.) (1999 & Supp. 2000). 
60 MINNESOTA INTELL. PROP. REVIEW [Vol. 3:59 
 
improperly, and in that situation the wronged party can recover 
for “wrongful seizure.”8  Even less well known is that punitive 
damages are available “in instances where the seizure was 
sought in bad faith.”9  Since the seizure statute was enacted 
there has been a relative handful of reported wrongful seizure 
cases.10   
In June, 2000, a jury in the Southern District of Texas, in 
the case Waco International Inc., v. KHK Scaffolding et al.,11 
found a seizure to be both wrongful and in bad faith, and 
awarded punitive damages against the party that improperly 
obtained an ex parte seizure.  This article will analyze that case 
to elucidate some of the hidden dangers in the seizure statute as 






 8. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(11) (2000) (providing in relevant part: “A person 
who suffers damage by reason of a wrongful seizure . . . shall be entitled to 
recover such relief as may be appropriate. . .”). 
 9. See id. 
 10. See Martin’s Herend Imps., Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading USA, Co., 
112 F.3d 1296 (5th Cir. 1997); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Accents, 955 F. Supp. 279 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997); Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Tee’s Ave., Inc., 924 F. 
Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. Jane Does # 1-2 and 
John Does # 1-10, 876 F. Supp. 407 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); Clorox Co. v. Inland 
Empire Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1065 (C.D. Cal. 1994); Hsu 
Terabyte Int’l, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 8 F.3d 27 (9th Cir. (Cal.) 1993); Elec. Lab. 
Supply Co. v. Cullen, 977 F.2d 798 (3rd Cir. 1992); Major League Baseball 
Promotion v. Colour-Tex, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 1035 (D.N.J. 1990); Gen. Elec. Co. 
v. Speicher, 877 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1989); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Speicher, 676 F. 
Supp. 1421 (N.D. Ind. 1988); and Skierkewiecz v. Gonzalez, 711 F. Supp. 931 
(N.D. Ill. 1989). 
 11. See C.A. No. H-98-1309.  On January 17, 2002, the Fifth Circuit 
decided Waco Int’l Inc., v. KHK Scaffolding et al.  See C.A. No. 00-20741.  F.3d. 
(5th Cir. 2002).  The Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court in all regards, most 
notably for this article finding that Waco's seizure was wrongful because it had 
seized legitimate, non-infringing merchandise.  See id.  The Court also rejected 
Waco's arguments that (1) the Judge's statement that the court had previously 
held on Summary Judgment that the seizure was wrongful was an erroneous 
"jury instruction," (2) that an experienced trademark attorney's expert 
testimony of the normal procedures for obtaining an ex parte seizure was 
impermissible testimony regarding the law, and (3) that KHK could not recover 
attorney's fees because it had not been awarded "actual" damages.  See id.  The 
Court, however, also rejected KHK's claim that the  trial court erred in not 
finding this an "exceptional case" and awarding all of KHK's attorney's fees.  
See id. 
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I. THE LAW 
 
A. THE SEIZURE STATUTE 
 
The eleven paragraphs of the seizure statute are a virtual 
checklist of steps to follow to obtain a seizure of counterfeit 
trademarked goods.  Congress intentionally drafted it in this 
manner to ensure “ample procedural protections for persons 
against whom such orders are issued.”12  This section sets out 
that checklist, with some elucidating commentary from the 
legislative history. 
 
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1):  Counterfeits. 
 
Seizures are only available in cases of where a counterfeit 
mark is used. 
 In the case of a civil action arising under [15 U.S.C. § 
1114(1)(a)] . . . with respect to a violation that consists of using a 
counterfeit mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or 
distribution of goods or services, the court may, upon ex parte 
application, grant an order under subsection (a) of this section 
pursuant to this subsection providing for the seizure of goods and 
counterfeit marks involved in such violation and the means of 
making such marks, and records documenting the manufacture, 
sale, or receipt of things involved in such violation.13 
The statute defines “counterfeit mark” as: 
a counterfeit of a mark that is registered on the principal register 
in the United States Patent and Trademark Office for such goods 
or services sold, offered for sale, or distributed and that is in use, 
whether or not the person against whom relief is sought knew such 
mark was so registered.14 
The Senate report to an early draft of the bill provides some 
guidance as to the scope of seizures in this regard.  “First, 
because the bill addresses only the use of spurious marks that 
are ‘identical to or substantially indistinguishable from’ a 
registered mark, it does not reach routine business disputes 
 
 12. See Joint Statement on Trademark Counterfeiting Legislation, 130 
CONG. REC. 31673 (1984), at 2080. 
 13. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1)(A). 
 14. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1)(B)(i). 
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about arguable instances of trademark infringement.”15  The bill 
also “does not include within its coverage so-called ‘gray market’ 
goods – i.e., authentic trademarked goods that have been 
obtained from overseas markets.”16  Finally, “the bill does not 
extend to imitations of trade dress or packaging, unless those 
features have been registered as trademarks on the principal 
register in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.”17 
 
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(2):  Notice to U.S. Attorney 
 
 The court shall not receive an application under this subsection 
unless the applicant has given such notice of the application as is 
reasonable under the circumstances to the United States attorney 
for the judicial district in which such order is sought.  Such 
attorney may participate in the proceedings arising under such 
application if such proceedings may affect evidence of an offense 
against the United States. The court may deny such application if 
the court determines that the public interest in a potential 
prosecution so requires.18 
Many counterfeiting cases involve criminal activity and are 
often investigated by law enforcement agencies.  Therefore, 
“under some circumstances, a privately obtained seizure order 
might interfere with an ongoing criminal investigation.”19  
Because of this, Congress has required that a civil applicant 
notify the U.S. Attorney before obtaining a seizure. 
 
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(3):  Application Requirements 
 
 The application for an order under this subsection shall - 
(A) be based on an affidavit or the verified complaint 
establishing facts sufficient to support the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law required for such order; and 
(B) contain the additional information required by paragraph 
(5) of this subsection to be set forth in such order.20 
 
 15. S. REP. NO. 98-526, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3627, at 3. 
 16. Id.  See also Martin’s Herend Imps., Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading 
USA, Co., 112 F.3d 1296 (5th Cir. 1997); infra note 80 and accompanying text 
(discussing gray market versus counterfeit goods). 
 17. S. REP. NO. 98-526, at 3. 
 18. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(2). 
 19. S. REP. NO. 98-526, at 18. 
 20. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(3). 
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To obtain a seizure the applicant must supply the court with 
both legal and factual information that supports the seizure.  
This section sets forth the basic requirements, but with 
reference to the two subsequent sections.  Congress noted that 
an application for seizure is “an ex parte proceeding” and “the 
court will have no choice but to rely on the representations of 
the applicant.”21 
 
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(4):  Additional Application  
 Requirements 
 
  The court shall not grant such an application unless - 
(A) the person obtaining an order under this subsection 
provides the security determined adequate by the court for the 
payment of such damages as any person may be entitled to recover 
as a result of a wrongful seizure or wrongful attempted seizure 
under this subsection . . .22 
The first part of this section requires posting of a bond as 
security “to ensure that the defendant will be made whole if the 
seizure should prove to have been wrongful.”23  Congress also 
stated that the “provision of a bond is one of the critical 
procedural protections designed to ensure that the defendant’s 
rights are adequately protected during the course of an ex parte 
seizure.”24  Because of this, Congress recommended that in 
“setting the amount of security, courts should err on the side of 
caution – that is, towards larger bonds – in light of the need to 
protect the unrepresented defendant.”25 
 The court shall not grant such an application unless – . . . 
(B) the court finds that it clearly appears from specific facts 
that - 
(i) an order other than an ex parte seizure order is not 
adequate to achieve the purposes of [15 U.S.C. § 1114]; 
(ii) the applicant has not publicized the requested seizure; 
(iii) the applicant is likely to succeed in showing that the 
person against whom seizure would be ordered used a counterfeit 
mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or distribution 
 
 21. See Joint Statement on Trademark Counterfeiting Legislation, 130 
CONG. REC. 31673 (1984), at 2080. 
 22. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(4). 
 23. See 130 CONG. REC. 31673, at 2080. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
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of goods or services; 
(iv) an immediate and irreparable injury will occur if such 
seizure is not ordered; 
(v) the matter to be seized will be located at the place 
identified in the application; 
(vi) the harm to the applicant of denying the application 
outweighs the harm to the legitimate interests of the person 
against whom seizure would be ordered of granting the application; 
and 
(vii) the person against whom seizure would be ordered, or 
persons acting in concert with such person, would destroy, move, 
hide, or otherwise make such matter inaccessible to the court, if 
the applicant were to proceed on notice to such person.26 
The second part of this section requires that the court make 
rather extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law.  The 
court’s findings by necessity are dependent upon the information 
supplied by the applicant.  As the Senate Committee noted, the  
court must find a sufficient basis for concluding, based upon sworn 
statements submitted by the applicant, that: (1) there are 
counterfeit goods or other listed materials at the place identified by 
the applicant, and (2) the applicant will suffer immediate and 
irreparable harm if the goods or materials are not seized through 
an ex parte order.27 
The legislative history highlights subsection (vii), which 
requires a showing that the defendant would not comply with 
ordinary judicial procedures, as “the key to obtaining an ex parte 
seizure order.”28  This subsection requires, “in essence, that the 
applicant show that if he or she were to proceed on notice to the 
defendant, the defendant or persons associated with the 
defendant would destroy, transfer, or hide the materials in 
question, or otherwise make them inaccessible to the court’s 
jurisdiction.”29  Congress noted that this type of behavior is 
common among “fly-by-night” counterfeiters, but it “would not 
be appropriate to order such a seizure against a reputable 
merchant, absent unusual circumstances.”30  This is because a 
“reputable businessperson would not be likely to conceal or 
destroy evidence when notified of a pending lawsuit, and the 
 
 26. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(4). 
 27. S. REP. NO. 98-526, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3627, at 16. 
 28. 130 CONG. REC. 31673, at 12081. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
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issuance of an ex parte seizure order against such a person 
would therefore be wholly inappropriate.”31 
 
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(5):  Requirements of Seizure Order. 
 
   An order under this subsection shall set forth - 
(A) the findings of fact and conclusions of law required for the 
order; 
(B) a particular description of the matter to be seized, and a 
description of each place at which such matter is to be seized; 
(C) the time period, which shall end not later than seven days 
after the date on which such order is issued, during which the 
seizure is to be made; 
(D) the amount of security required to be provided under this 
subsection; and 
(E) a date for the hearing required under paragraph (10) of 
this subsection.32 
This subsection sets forth the contents of the seizure order 
issued by the court. One of the requirements, that the goods to 
be seized and the location of the goods, be set out with some 
particularity, is designed to meet the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment.33 
 
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(6):  Limitation on Publicity. 
 
“The court shall take appropriate action to protect the 
person against whom an order under this subsection is directed 
from publicity, by or at the behest of the plaintiff, about such 
order and any seizure under such order.”34 
Congress noted that because “the unfairness of publicizing a 
seizure order obtained without the defendant’s knowledge forms 
the basis for limiting the plaintiff’s efforts to publicize the 
seizure, the need for protection will primarily exist before and 
during the seizure.”35  This subsection appears to be designed to 
complement subsection 8, which requires the sealing of the 
record until after the seizure hearing. 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(5) (2000). 
 33. See infra notes and accompanying text.  
 34. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(6). 
 35. 130 CONG. REC. 31673, at 12082. 
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7. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(7):  Disposition of the Seized Goods. 
 
 Any materials seized under this subsection shall be taken into 
the custody of the court.  The court shall enter an appropriate 
protective order with respect to discovery by the applicant of any 
records that have been seized.  The protective order shall provide 
for appropriate procedures to assure that confidential information 
contained in such records is not improperly disclosed to the 
applicant.36 
This subsection is also designed to protect the defendant.  
Congress noted that the seizure of business “records poses 
particularly difficult issues, since such documents may contain 
sensitive business information.  If any records have been seized, 
therefore, the court should enter an appropriate protective order 
with respect to discovery of the records.”37 
 
8. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(8):  Sealing the Record. 
 
  An order under this subsection, together with the supporting 
documents, shall be sealed until the person against whom the order is 
directed has an opportunity to contest such order, except that any person 
against whom such order is issued shall have access to such order and 
supporting documents after the seizure has been carried out.38 
This subsection is a further effort to protect the defendant 
should the seizure prove unwarranted.  To this end, Congress 
decided that the record should be sealed until “the defendant 
has been given an opportunity to contest [the order].”39  The 
Senate Committee was “particularly concerned that the good 
will of the defendants not be unfairly injured before they have 
had their day in court.”40 
 
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(9):  Service of Seizure by Law  
Enforcement. 
 
 The court shall order that service of a copy of the order under 
this subsection shall be made by a Federal law enforcement officer 
 
 36. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(7) (2000). 
 37. 130 CONG. REC. 31673, at 12082. 
 38. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(8). 
 39. S. REP. NO. 98-526, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3627, at 16. 
 40. Id. 
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(such as a United States marshal or an officer or agent of the 
United States Customs Service, Secret Service, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, or Post Office) or may be made by a State or local 
law enforcement officer, who, upon making service, shall carry out 
the seizure under the order.  The court shall issue orders, when 
appropriate, to protect the defendant from undue damage from the 
disclosure of trade secrets or other confidential information during 
the course of the seizure, including, when appropriate, orders 
restricting the access of the applicant (or any agent or employee of 
the applicant) to such secrets or information.41 
This subsection is also included, in part, for the protection of 
the defendant. The Senate Committee stated that “for the 
maintenance of public order, it is important that law 
enforcement officials, and not private citizens, enforce seizure 
orders.”42  However, this subsection also requires the court to 
“issue appropriate orders to ensure that trade secrets or other 
confidential data are not improperly disclosed during the course 
of the seizure.”43 
 
10.  15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(10):  Hearing. 
 
(A) The court shall hold a hearing, unless waived by all the 
parties, on the date set by the court in the order of seizure. That 
date shall be not sooner than ten days after the order is issued and 
not later than fifteen days after the order is issued, unless the 
applicant for the order shows good cause for another date or unless 
the party against whom such order is directed consents to another 
date for such hearing.  At such hearing the party obtaining the 
order shall have the burden to prove that the facts supporting 
findings of fact and conclusions of law necessary to support such 
order are still in effect.  If that party fails to meet that burden, the 
seizure order shall be dissolved or modified appropriately. 
(B) In connection with a hearing under this paragraph, the 
court may make such orders modifying the time limits for discovery 
under the Rules of Civil Procedure as may be necessary to prevent 
the frustration of the purposes of such hearing.44 
Finally, Congress required that a hearing be held to 
 
 41. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(9). 
 42. S. REP. NO. 98-526, at 17. 
 43. Joint Statement on Trademark Counterfeiting Legislation, 130 CONG. 
REC. 31673 (1984), at 12082. 
 44. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(10) (2000). 
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determine “the propriety of the seizure order.”45   
 At the hearing, the plaintiff will have the burden of showing that 
the seizure order was justified and that it continues to be 
justifiable to hold the defendant’s goods or other materials. . . If the 
plaintiff is unable to show that continuation of the seizure order is 
justified, however, the seizure order should be dissolved or 
modified appropriately.46 
 
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(11):  Wrongful Seizure. 
 
    A person who suffers damage by reason of a wrongful seizure 
under this subsection has a cause of action against the applicant 
for the order under which such seizure was made, and shall be 
entitled to recover such relief as may be appropriate, including 
damages for lost profits, cost of materials, loss of good will, and 
punitive damages in instances where the seizure was sought in bad 
faith, and, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances, to 
recover a reasonable attorney’s fee.  The court in its discretion may 
award prejudgment interest on relief recovered under this 
paragraph, at an annual interest rate established under section 
6621 of title 26, commencing on the date of service of the claimant’s 
pleading setting forth the claim under this paragraph and ending 
on the date such recovery is granted, or for such shorter time as 
the court deems appropriate.47 
If it turns out that the seizure was not justified, the 
defendant may bring a claim against the applicant to recover 
any damages as a result of the seizure.  Congress specifically 
stated that, “a person who is subject to a wrongful ex parte 
seizure should be fully compensated by the party who obtained 
the seizure order.”48 
In the years since the seizure statute was enacted, seizures 
have become a relatively commonplace tool in the fight against 
counterfeiters.  While common, they are not routine.  As one 
practitioner’s guide explained: “It would be a fundamental and 
possibly fatal mistake for counsel or mark owners to treat such 
applications as anything other than incredibly extraordinary 
proceedings.”49  The legislative history for the seizure statute 
 
 45. 130 CONG. REC. 31673, at 12082. 
 46. Id. 
 47. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(11) (2000). 
 48. 130 CONG. REC. 31673, at 12080. 
 49. TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING, supra note 7, at 5-16. 
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supports this contention, stating that a seizure is considered to 
be an “extraordinary remedy.”50  Courts agree: “Ex parte seizures 
are dangerous weapons, which, if not carried out with utmost 
care and restraint, create a potential for great abuse.  They 
must be extremely limited in scope and seizures which go 
beyond such limits must be deemed wrongful, entitling 
defendant to relief under section 1116(d)(11).”51 
The legislative history provides some limited guidance as to the 
confines of an ex parte seizure. The term wrongful seizure “was 
intentionally left undefined . . . in the belief that the courts will best 
be able to interpret this phrase under the circumstances of each 
individual case, and in light of precedents under Rule 65 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”  Congress does, however, set 
out a few “rules of thumb” for determining whether a seizure 
might be wrongful: 
 The first is that the mere fact that a few legitimate items may 
have been seized does not make the seizure as a whole 
wrongful. . . . The second is that the seizure will be considered 
wrongful if the applicant acted in bad faith in seeking it.  For 
example, it would obviously constitute bad faith for an applicant to 
seek a seizure order in an effort to prevent the sale of legitimate 
merchandise at discount prices.  Similarly, it would constitute bad 
faith for an applicant deliberately to defy a court order limiting its 
access to confidential documents seized from the defendant.  Third, 
a seizure must be considered ‘wrongful’ if the matter seized is 
legitimate, noninfringing merchandise.  In such a case, even if the 
plaintiff acted in good faith, the defendant should  be compensated 
for his or her losses caused by the plaintiff’s use of an ex parte 
process.52 
The Senate report, which preceded the Joint Committee report, 
adds some details to the proposal behind the wrongful seizure 
provision, and fleshes out some requirements for a bad faith 
seizure: 
 The Committee wishes to discourage frivolous of [sic] nuisance 
suits under the bill, and to help prevent an allegation or [sic] 
counterfeiting from becoming a “boiler plate” pleading in every 
trademark suit.  Should a party bring a suit in bad faith under this 
bill – for example, as part of an effort to control the resale prices of 
 
 50. 130 CONG. REC. 31673, at 12082. 
 51. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Speicher, 676 F. Supp. 1421, 1436 (N.D. Ind. 1988). 
 52. 130 CONG. REC. H12083 (comprising the only mention of “bad faith” in 
the legislative history of this statute). 
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authentic trademarked goods – this subsection provides that the 
victimized defendant will be entitled to an award of damages, 
including punitive damages when appropriate, and the costs of 
defending the action, including reasonable attorney’s and 
investigator’s fees.  The Committee believes that if a defendant can 
show that the plaintiff pleaded or pursued a suit against him or 
her in bad faith, an award of substantial punitive damages will 
usually be appropriate. . . . [A] plaintiff need not have conclusive 
proof that the defendant has intentionally trafficked in known 
counterfeits in order to file a suit under this bill.  Should a plaintiff 
plead or pursue a suit when it is clear that the suit is baseless, 
however, this provision would make the plaintiff liable in damages 
to the victimized defendant.  For example, should the plaintiff 
learn as a result of discovery that any claim of counterfeiting is 
meritless, continued pursuit of such a claim would be in bad faith.53 
 
 B. SEIZURE CASES 
 
Since the statute was enacted there have been about a dozen 
seizure cases, but only a handful involving a counterclaim for 
wrongful seizure.  Most were unsuccessful, and none was found a 
seizure to be in bad faith.  However, these cases do provide some 
additional guidance regarding the proper way to obtain a seizure. 
 
1. Basic Seizure Cases. 
 
At least three cases have upheld the seizure of clearly 
counterfeit goods54 but none of them analyzed the seizure statute 
in any detail.  In one case, the court noted that the applicant 
had fully investigated the counterfeiter, and fully supported its 
seizure application with believable evidence.55  In a second case, 
the court upheld the seizure on a 12(b)(6) motion, and noted  
that a counterclaim under Section 1116 (d)(11) would be a more 
appropriate remedy for allegation that the seizure was 
wrongful.56  One court, the district court of Puerto Rico, went 
 
 53. S. REP. NO. 98-526, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3627, at 19. 
 54. See Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Maphia, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994) 
(seizure of counterfeit computer programs); see also Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, 
Inc. v. Tee’s Ave., Inc., 924 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (seizure of counterfeit 
Hilfiger clothing); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Accents, 955 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(seizure of counterfeit Gucci handbags). 
 55. See Gucci Am., 955 F. Supp. 279, at 955. 
 56. See Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 17. 
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beyond the literal scope of the seizure statute, and allowed the 
seizure of T-shirts that probably were not technically 
counterfeit.57 
In upholding the seizure of counterfeits, the Third Circuit 
noted that Congress considered ‘ex parte seizures a necessary 
tool to thwart the bad faith efforts of fly by night defendants to 
evade the jurisdiction of the court,’ and intended seizure orders 
to be available whenever a temporary restraining order and the 
threat of contempt for a violation thereof are unlikely to result 
in preservation of the evidence and the removal of the 
counterfeit merchandise from commerce.58 
At least one court held that the seizure of business records 
is not wrongful.59  The court allowed the seizure of counterfeit 
Reebok athletic shoes, froze the defendant’s assets, and allowed 
the seizure of defendant’s business records.  The court noted 
that this was within the equitable powers of the court, and, 
without detailed analysis, found that “the Seizure Order was 
properly granted in accordance with the Trademark 
Counterfeiting Act of 1984.”60 
A number of courts have addressed the Fourth Amendment 
issues raised by the seizure statute, and have found that a 
properly conducted seizure satisfies the Constitutional 
requirements.  In two cases, the seizures were upheld.61  In at 
least two cases, the courts denied the seizures based on Fourth 
Amendment concerns.  In the first, Sports Design and Dev., Inc., 
v. Schonebaum, the court denied the seizure because the 
location of the allegedly offending goods was not adequately 
described.62  In the second case, Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. Doe,63 
 
 57. See Pepe (U.K.) Ltd. v. Ocean View Factory Outlet Corp., 770 F. Supp. 
754 (D. Puerto Rico 1991) (discussed in more detail under section on 
counterfeiting, infra and accompanying text). 
 58. See Vuitton v. White, 945 F.2d 569, 575 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting 130 
CONG. REC. H120781). 
 59. See Reebok Int’l, Ltd, v. Marnatech Enter., Inc., 737 F. Supp. 1521 
(S.D. Cal. 1989). 
 60. Id. at 1525 (citing to 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (d)(1)(A) (1988). 
 61. See Reebok Int’l, Ltd. v. Su Youn Pak, 683 F. Supp. 929, 930 (S.D.N.Y. 
1988) (The court noted briefly that the application for seizure provided 
sufficient facts to support the application and met the requirements of the 
seizure statute and Fourth Amendment.); see also General Motors Corp. v. 
Gibson Chemical & Oil Corp., 786 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 62.  871 F. Supp. 1158, 1166 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (noting that the plaintiff’s 
investigation never determined that counterfeit goods were in the defendant’s 
home, and therefore, seizure should be denied). 
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the court determined that a seizure application did not meet the 
specificity requirements of the Fourth Amendment.  The 
plaintiff sought the seizure of T-shirts bearing counterfeit 
depictions of Looney Tunes characters (Bugs Bunny, Daffy 
Duck, etc.) from unknown defendants presumed to be operating 
from a building in Brooklyn, New York.  The court set out the 
provisions of the statute, and noted the requirement specifying 
the location of the goods to be seized: 
 With respect to requirement that the application identify the 
place where the matter to be seized may be found, Congress 
acknowledged that courts will have to be flexible – “but should 
require as great a degree of specificity as is possible under the 
circumstances, and should not grant orders, for example, 
permitting seizure to take place ‘anywhere in downtown 
Washington, DC.”
64 
The court then noted that the broad seizure application 
requested by the plaintiff would not satisfy the particularity 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment, and quoted from the 
Supreme Court to explain the purpose of the particularity 
requirement: 
 The manifest purpose of this particularity requirement was to 
prevent general searches.  By limiting the authorization to search 
to the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause to 
search, the requirement ensures that the search will be carefully 
tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of 
the side-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to 
prohibit.  Thus, the scope of a lawful search is “defined by the 
object of the search and the place in which there is a probably 
cause to believe that it may be found.”65 
The plaintiff’s seizure application asked to seize the inventory of 
the defendants (whose identity was unknown) at any location in 







 63. See Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. Jane Does # 1-2 and John Does # 1-10, 
876 F. Supp. 407, 407 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). 
 64. Id. at 411 (quoting 130 CONG. REC. H12076 (1984)). 
 65. Id. at 413 (quoting Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987)). 
 66. See Time Warner Entm’t Co., 876 F. Supp. 407, at 413. 
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2.  Wrongful Seizure Cases 
 
A finding of wrongful seizure most frequently occurs when 
the goods seized were not in fact counterfeits.  For example, in 
Clorox Co. v. Inland Empire Wholesale Grocers, Inc., the 
defendant was accused of placing counterfeit “Pine-Sol”® labels 
on generic pine cleaners.67  In fact, the defendant produced 
generic cleaners that it occasionally shipped without labels for 
purchasers who would attach their own labels.  The defendant 
counter-sued for wrongful seizure, and the plaintiff sought to 
dismiss the counterclaim. The court noted that the goods were 
not counterfeits, and refused to dismiss the counterclaim.  An ex 
parte seizure order has been called a “drastic” remedy which 
should be ordered only as a last resort.  There are statutory 
safeguards present in 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (d)(4), (7), and (11).  A 
seizure is wrongful:  
if the applicant acted in bad faith in seeking it.  For example, it 
would obviously constitute bad faith for an applicant to seek a 
seizure order in an effort to prevent the sale of legitimate 
merchandise at discount prices. . . [A] seizure must be considered 
“wrongful” if the matter seized is legitimate, noninfringing 
merchandise.68 
In a second case, the trial court initially determined that 
the goods were not counterfeits because they did not bear 
counterfeit marks, even though they were placed in a box with 
the counterfeit marks.69  The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed, determining that the goods were counterfeits.70  
Finally, in a third case, a court determined that it would be 
wrongful to seize non-counterfeit goods, but without an actual 
seizure there can be no claim for wrongful seizure.71  In that 
case, the defendant – who had been contracted by an authorized 
distributor to make “Budweiser” T-shirts – voluntarily turned 
over the shirts.  The defendant argued that even though there 
 
 67.  See Clorox Co. v. Inland Empire Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 874 F.  Supp. 1065, 
1065 (C.D. Cal. 1994). 
 68. Id. at 1071 (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Speicher, 681 F.  Supp. at 1342, 
and quoting Major League Baseball Promotions v. Colour-Tex, 729 F. Supp. 
1035, 1048 (D.N.J. 1990). 
 69. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Speicher, 676 F.Supp 1421 (N.D. Ind. 1988), upheld 
on reh’g, 681 F. Supp. 1337 (N.D. Ind, 1988). 
 70. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Speicher, 877 F.2d 531, 531 (7th Cir. 1989); see 
also infra Part IV.A. 
 71. See Major League Baseball Promotion Corp. v. Colour-Tex, Inc., 729 F. 
Supp. 1035 (D.N.J. 1990). 
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was no actual seizure, invalid application made the seizure 
wrongful.  The court disagreed, and determined that the 
wrongful seizure statute applied only in cases of actual 
seizures.72 
In a second line of wrongful seizure cases, aggrieved 
defendants sought to bring a wrongful seizure action against the 
attorney who obtained the seizure as well as the plaintiff 
represented by that attorney.  In one early seizure case, a 
Federal court in Illinois determined that the attorney for the 
applicant could be sued for wrongful seizure.73  The court noted 
numerous errors in the seizure application, and allowed the 
party whose goods had been seized to sue the plaintiff’s 
attorneys for wrongful seizure, abuse of process, trespass to 
land, and trespass to chattel.  This holding was directly 
contradicted by the Third Circuit in Elec. Lab Supply Co. v. 
Cullen.74  The plaintiff (“ELSCO”) was in the business of 
disposing of electronic parts and retrieving the valuable portions 
for companies like Motorola.  When Motorola found that Hong 
Kong companies were selling electronic equipment that 
contained Motorola semiconductors, they suspected ELSCO 
might be involved, but an investigation determined that this 
was highly unlikely.  Despite its own investigation, Motorola 
obtained an ex parte seizure order under 15 U.S.C. §1116 (d), but 
was unable to find any evidence that ELSCO was selling its 
semiconductors.  ELSCO countersued for wrongful seizure, and 
Motorola settled.  ELSCO then sued the attorneys that had 
obtained the seizure order, claiming they had withheld 
information, and misled the court in the seizure application.  
The court went through the seizure statute point by point, but 
determined that the term “applicant” in the seizure statute does 
not include the applicant’s attorneys.75 
Finally, it should be noted that in at least one case, the 
victim of a wrongful seizure successfully brought sanctions 
against the attorneys who wrongfully brought the seizures, 
though the sanctions were later vacated.  In Super Power 
Supply, Inc. v. Macase Indus. Corp., the court initially awarded 
sanctions against the seizure applicant’s attorney because of 
numerous misstatements he made in the seizure application and 
 
 72. See id. at 1051 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (d)(11)). 
 73. See Skierkewiecz v. Gonzalez, 711 F. Supp. 931, 931 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 
 74. See Elec. Lab. Supply Co. v. Cullen, 977 F.2d 798, 798 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 75. See id. at 808. 
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at subsequent hearings.76  The court noted that it in ex parte 
proceedings it must rely on the applicant to be truthful.  “Where 
such extraordinary relief as an unnoticed, ex parte seizure order 
is sought, the court necessarily relies upon the diligence, 
honesty, and forthrightness of the represented party’s counsel to 
ensure that the rights of the unrepresented party are not unduly 
infringed.”77  The court then imposed sanctions on the applicant’s 
attorney because he should have known there was no basis for 
the ex parte seizure, he misrepresented facts to the court, and 
did not correct these errors once he became aware of them.78 
 
3.  Bad Faith Wrongful Seizure 
 
Finally, there is at least one case that deals with the issue 
of whether a seizure was sought or obtained in bad faith such 
that it would warrant punitive damages.  This issue was 
addressed by the Fifth Circuit twice in Martin’s Herend Imports, 
Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading USA, Co.79 Martin’s Herend 
was the exclusive importer for Herendi porcelain.80  Diamond & 
Gem sold Herendi porcelain that the proprietor had purchased 
in Hungary and the United States.81  Martin’s Herend sued 
Diamond & Gem for trademark infringement and trademark 
counterfeiting, and sought an obtained an ex parte seizure order, 
seizing Diamond & Gem’s stock of Herendi porcelain.82  At trial, 
the court granted Martin’s Herend’s motion for summary 
judgment for trademark infringement, and dismissed Diamond 
& Gem’s counterclaim for wrongful seizure.83 
In Martin’s Herend I, the Fifth Circuit held that the district 
court erred in dismissing the defendant’s counterclaim for 
wrongful seizure.  “Given the draconian nature of this ex parte 
 
 76.  154 F.R.D. 249 (C.D. Cal. 1994) vacated in part, 1995 US Dist Lexis 
22276 (C.D. Cal. Jan 31, 1995). 
 77. Id. at 256. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See Martin’s Herend Imps., Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading USA, Co., 
112 F.3d 1296, 1296 (5th Cir. 1997) (aff’d in part after remand, 195 F.3d 765 
(5th Cir. 1999).  Only the first iteration of Martin’s Herend (Martin’s Herend I) 
was available when Waco filed suit.  The second case (Martin’s Herend II) was 
decided just before the original trial date of the Waco case. 
 80. See id, at 1299. 
 81. Herendi manufactures high quality tableware and figurines in 
Hungary.  See id. 
 82. See id. 
 83. See id. at 1300. 
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remedy, providing for the seizure of defendant’s wares and 
records without prior notice . . . we believe that it should be 
narrowly construed.”84  The court remanded, noting that the 
statute specifically excludes gray market goods like the 
defendant’s; therefore, the district court erred in dismissing the 
defendant’s counterclaims.85 
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Martin’s Herend II,86 was 
decided after Waco had filed suit, but provided guidance directly 
on the issue of a bad faith wrongful seizure.  Martin’s Herend – 
the exclusive U.S. distributor of Hungarian Herendi porcelain – 
obtained an ex parte seizure of “gray market” Herendi porcelain 
distributed by Diamond & Gem.  Diamond & Gem asserted at 
trial on remand “that the standard for bad faith is an objective 
one that can be evinced by ‘anticompetitive motive’ coupled with 
‘knowing lack of need for a seizure.’”87  The Fifth Circuit 
affirmed the legal standard applied by the trial court, “namely, 
whether Martin’s sought the seizure knowing it was baseless.”88  
The appellate court also noted that a good faith belief that an 
operation is selling counterfeit goods need not even be true: “‘[A] 
plaintiff need not have conclusive proof that the defendant has 
intentionally trafficked in known counterfeits in order to file 
suit.’ S.REP. NO. 98-526, at 19, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3645.  
Accordingly, the [district] court used the right standard for 
finding bad faith.”89 
This was the general state of counterfeiting and seizure law 
that existed in June 1998, before Waco Scaffolding went to court 
and obtained a seizure order.  A simple reading of the statute 
provides a road map of how to conduct a seizure; the legislative 
history provides some insight as to the outside boundaries of an 
acceptable seizure, and the case law adds real world examples.  
The law in this regard is fairly clear. So what happened with 
 
 84. See id. at 1306. 
 85. See id. 
 86. 195 F.3d 765 (5th Cir. 1999).  The party bringing the claim of wrongful 
seizure has the burden of proof to show that the seizure was wrongful and, if 
applicable, obtained in bad faith.  See id.  Diamond & Gem had argued that 
because the applicant had the burden in obtaining the seizure, they retained 
the burden of showing that the seizure was not wrongful.  See id.  The Court of 
Appeals rejected this argument.  See id. 
 87. 195 F.3d at 773. 
 88. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 98-526, at 19).  “Should a plaintiff plead or 
pursue a suit when it is clear that the suit is baseless, however, this provision 
would make the plaintiff liable in damages to the victimized defendant.”  Id. 
 89. 195 F.3d at 773. 
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Waco seizure?  What did Waco do to engage in a “bad faith 
wrongful seizure”?  A brief discussion of the facts, both operative 
and merely interesting, sets the stage. 
 
III.  BACKGROUND 
 
Both the plaintiff, Waco Scaffolding, and the defendant, 
KHK Scaffolding, manufacture and sell scaffolding.  Waco has 
been making scaffolding in the United States since the late 
1940’s.90  Its main product line is “frame scaffolding,”91 although 
it also sells some “system scaffolding.”92  The colors red and blue 
are Waco’s primary choice for its frame scaffolding.93 
KHK has been making and selling scaffolding in Europe and 
the Middle East since the late 1970s.94  In the mid 1990s KHK 
began selling system scaffolding in the United States from an 
office in Houston, Texas.  In 1997, KHK expanded its line of 
scaffolding to include frame scaffolding.95  KHK sold frame 
scaffolding in red and blue, which are common colors in the 
scaffolding industry.96 
As is undoubtedly appreciated by anyone who has ever seen 
 
 90. The name Waco is an acronym for the name of the original company, 
the Wilson-Albrecht Company. Background information on Waco Scaffolding 
was obtained from Waco’s web site at <http://www.wacoscaf.com>. 
 91. Frame scaffolding consists of a two rectangular end frames attached by 
two cross braces to form a frame box.  Planks are then placed on the top of the 
frames to create a work platform.  These are the most commonly seen 
scaffolding on the sides of buildings.  See Waco Int'l, Inc. v. KHK Scaffolding, et 
al., C.A. No. H-98-1309, (Plaintiff Trial Exhibit 23, “Waco’s Guide to 
Scaffolding”). 
 92. System scaffolding consists of bars and connectors, similar to an 
Erector Set®, that allows the creation of irregular shaped scaffolding 
structures.  Id. 
 93. Paint color was a major point of contention in the case, and the 
evidence revealed that most major scaffolding companies sell their product in 
certain colors.  For example, Vanguard is generally blue, Safway is generally 
gray, and Waco is generally red.  However, it has been standard practice in the 
industry for many years to paint scaffolding to match a customers existing 
stock, so there can be no trademark rights in the colors. 
 94. Information regarding the history of the two companies was not 
presented at trial. 
 95. Waco Int’l, Inc., C.A. No. H-98-1309, (Defendant’s Answer and 
Counterclaims, ¶ 26). 
 96. Evidence at trial proved that many other manufactures use red and 
blue as primary colors, and most manufacturers will paint to match a 
customers existing stock of frame scaffolding.  See, e.g., Waco Int’l, Inc., C.A. 
No. H-98-1309, (Testimony of Frank Shemek, Trial Transcript, 835 – 837 (June 
20, 2000)). 
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scaffolding, there are only a handful of possible configurations 
for frame scaffolding.  Most of these configurations were 
developed by scaffolding companies well over twenty years ago.97  
Most scaffolding companies now make frames in these 
configurations, and it is common to refer to these configurations 
by the name of the first company to develop them.  So, for 
example, there is a Safway style frame, a Vanguard style frame, 
and a Waco style frame.  Most companies accept this fact, but 
Waco has attempted for years to stop people in the industry 
from using the term “Waco style” scaffolding. 
When KHK entered the frame scaffolding market, it sent 
out introduction letters and brochures for its products stating 
that it sells most major styles, and that its frames are 
compatible with “Safway, Vanguard, and Waco” style frames.  
Thousands of these letters were sent out in late 1997 and early 
1998.  Letters were sent to most scaffolding manufacturers, 
sellers, renters, and users throughout the United States.  
Letters and brochures were even sent to Waco and its many 
distributors.  In early 1998, when KHK began to actually sell 
frame scaffolding, its salesmen (either by error or force of habit 
based on common industry practice) sent out a handful of 
solicitation and quotation letters, 98 and a number of invoices,99 
that referred to KHK’s product as “WACO” scaffolding. 
A Waco distributor in Ohio received a quotation stating: 
“here is a quote for your Waco Red Scaffolding.”100  The 
distributor forwarded the letter to Waco, who in turn notified its 
attorney in Houston, Texas.  Concerned that KHK might be 
attempting to pass off KHK goods as genuine Waco scaffolding, 
Waco’s Houston attorney sent KHK a “cease and desist” letter.  
When KHK received the letter, its manager distributed a memo 
to company salesmen explaining proper sales terminology, and 
instructing employees to tell customers that they sold 
scaffolding compatible with major manufacturers, including 
Waco.  Unfortunately, KHK did not otherwise respond to the 
letter to either Waco or its attorneys until nearly a month later 
 
 97. And, therefore, any patent on the configuration has long expired. The 
configurations are in the public domain, and any company can copy the 
configuration. 
 98. Waco submitted approximately six into evidence at trial. 
 99. Approximately thirty were submitted into evidence at trial. 
 100. The KHK salesman who made the quote testified in his deposition that 
he only quoted what the customer asked for, so in this case he claims the 
customer asked for a quote on “Waco Red and Blue” scaffolding.  The 
distributor disputed this at trial. 
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because the president of the company was traveling in the 
Middle East on business. 
In the interim, and concerned by the lack of response to the 
cease and desist letter, Waco’s attorneys hired an investigator to 
go to KHK and buy some of the frame scaffolding.  The 
investigator was given a list of frames that were described as 
“Waco compatible” in the KHK sales brochure.101  The 
investigator’s report stated that he was taken through the 
facility by a salesman who explained that KHK did not currently 
stock the “WB” (or “Waco blue” style frame), but they did have 
the “WR” (“Waco red” style) frame.  The investigator stated that 
the KHK salesman never use the term “Waco” during his visit. 
After showing the investigator the red frame scaffolding, the 
salesman filled out an order sheet that listed the frames by part 
number.  He gave this sheet to a shipping clerk who filled out a 
shipping report form for the warehouse to bring the proper 
frames to the loading dock for the investigator to pick up.  This 
shipping report referred to the frames as “Waco 5’ x 6’7” frames.”  
The investigator picked up the frames and shipped them the 
Waco’s headquarters in Cleveland, Ohio.  Later that day the 
KHK salesman realized that the investigator had not received 
an invoice for the goods, so mailed him a copy.  The invoice 
referred to the scaffolding frames by the part number and did 
not mention “Waco” at all. 
This information was turned over the Waco’s local counsel 
in Houston.  The attorney stated that it was her impression from 
these documents and the investigator’s report, that KHK was 
selling counterfeit “Waco” scaffolding.  She also inferred from 
the variance between the shipping report and the invoice that 
KHK was either trying to hide their activities, or actively 
altering documents.  Based on this interpretation, Waco applied 
for an ex parte seizure order.  Waco asserted that KHK’s goods 
were “counterfeit” because the Waco terminology had been used 
“in connection with” the sale of the KHK scaffolding.102  Waco 
obtained the seizure order on April 30, 1998, and carried out the 




 101. The investigator was directed to purchase scaffolding by the item 
number listed in the KHK brochure for the compatible product. 
 102. See Waco Int’l, Inc., C.A. No. H-98-1309, (Plaintiff’s Original Verified 
Complaint, ¶ 42). 




As set forth above, the state of the law was fairly clear, as 
were the facts available to Waco when it filed the application for 
a seizure.  The application set in motion a chain of events that 
ultimately led to a jury determining that Waco’s seizure was 
wrongful, and conducted in bad faith. 
How did that happen? What did Waco do that turned its 
case against an alleged “counterfeiter” onto its head, resulting in 
an award against Waco?  The answer and the analysis will start 
with Waco’s erroneous definition of counterfeiting.103  For the 
sake of clarity and logic, the analysis of Waco’s actions, and how 
they were found to be in bad faith, will follow the basic 
requirements of the seizure statute.  It is important to note that 
Waco did not improperly follow every step in the seizure 
checklist, and therefore, not every statutory section will be 
addressed.  However, each of the errors will be described in the 
order they arise within the statute. 
 
A.  COUNTERFEITING 
 
The first paragraph of the seizure statute states that 
seizure is only available in cases “that consist[] of using a 
counterfeit mark.”104  Waco admitted that KHK never placed a 
spurious mark on its products.  It was known from the 
beginning of the case that Waco’s investigator did not purchase 
KHK scaffolding with a Waco trademark on them.  Waco’s 
central allegation in obtaining the seizure was the KHK was 
selling “counterfeit” scaffolding.  This contention was based on 
the fact that KHK had used the “Waco” terminology105 on 
invoices “in connection with the sale” of KHK’s compatible 
scaffolding painted in red.  The evidence at trial showed that 
KHK, and any other scaffolding producer, was free to sell 
 
 103. Waco was consistent throughout the two years of litigation in its 
insistence that KHK’s use of Waco terminology on handwritten sales 
documents constituted counterfeiting.  See Waco International, Inc., C.A. No. 
H-98-1309, (Plaintiff’s Original Verified Complaint, ¶ 42; Plaintiff’s Motion for 
Reconsideration of Order, For Modification of Judgment, and Alternatively for 
Partial New Trial, p. 4). 
 104. 15 U.S.C. §1116(d)(1)(A) (2000). 
 105. Waco never claimed that KHK used a likeness of its mark.  Waco’s 
contention dealt with the word marks “WACO” and “HI LOAD” that a KHK 
salesman wrote by hand on a shipping document. 
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compatible scaffolding in red.106  The jury also determined that 
KHK’s use of the “Waco” terminology was fair use to describe 
the compatibility of KHK’s scaffolding frames. 
Is it possible, however, that KHK’s use of the “Waco” 
terminology on documentation in connection with the sale of 
scaffolding could be counterfeiting?  Probably not.  Waco’s 
contention relies on a narrow, and ultimately erroneous, reading 
of the seizure statute, which authorizes a seizure “with respect 
to a violation that consists of using a counterfeit mark in 
connection with the sale, offering for sale, or distribution of 
goods. . . .”107 Waco’s narrow reading of the statute defies 
common sense, the case law, and statutory construction. 
The seizure statute defines a counterfeit mark as a 
counterfeit of a mark that is registered on the principal register in 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office for such goods or 
services sold, offered for sale, or distributed and that is in use, 
whether or not the person against whom relief is sought knew such 
mark was so registered.108   
This is in addition to the definition provided by the Lanham Act, 
which defines a “counterfeit mark [as] a spurious mark which is 
identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a 
registered mark.”109 
The seizure statute applies in civil actions “arising under 
section 32(1)(a) of this title . . . with respect to a violation that 
consists of using a counterfeit mark.”110 Such civil actions are, 
therefore, entirely dependant upon the statutory definitions of 
Section 1114, which provides the remedies for trademark 
infringement.  Section 1114(1) states in pertinent part that any 
person who shall, without the consent of the registrant –  
 (a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable 
imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for 
sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in 
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause 
 
 106. Waco’s President and Vice President admitted at trial that the Waco 
scaffolding configuration was in the public domain, and anyone could produce 
and sell it.  They also stated that they could not stop anyone from selling red 
scaffolding.  Their only objection was to the description of this look-a-like 
product as “Waco” style scaffolding.  The jury ultimately determined that this 
description was fair use. 
 107. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1)(A) (2000). 
 108. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1)(B). 
 109. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). 
 110. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) (1)(A). 
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mistake, or to deceive. . .shall be liable for trademark infringement.111 
The definition section of the Lanham act also provides that 
for 
purposes of this chapter, a mark shall be deemed to be in use in 
commerce  
(1) on goods when —  
(A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their 
containers or the displays associated therewith or on the tags or 
labels affixed thereto, or if the nature of the goods makes such 
placement impracticable, then on documents associated with the 
goods or their sale.112 
The Act further provides that a counterfeit mark is one that 
when placed in any manner on the goods makes it “identical 
with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a registered 
mark.”113  Use of a mark in association with goods only applies 
where “the nature of the goods makes such placement 
impracticable.”114  This definition is supported by virtually all 
reported cases involving counterfeits or allegations of 
counterfeiting.  One district court stated that a “counterfeit 
trademark is a falsely applied mark, identical to or substantially 
indistinguishable from the registered trademark.”115  
Unfortunately, the district court did not explain the reasoning 
behind this statement, although it is supported by the statutory 
construction set out above.   
Many other cases dealing with spurious marks affixed to 
look-a-like goods did not explicitly define the term, but applied 
the definition implicitly.116  Because these cases deal with clear-
 
 111. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 112. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (emphasis added). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id.  While the Court did not dissect the definition of counterfeiting in 
this manner, it ruled at both the Preliminary Injunction and Summary 
Judgment that KHK did not sell “counterfeit” goods and did not engage in 
“counterfeiting.”  See id. 
 115. Reebok Int’l. Ltd. v. K-Mart Corp., 849 F. Supp. 252, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 
1994) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 427; Montroes Rolex, S.A. v. Snyder, 718 F.2d 524, 
532 (2d Cir. 1982)), vacated as moot 33 U.S.P.Q.2d 1864 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) 
(settlement by parties renders previous ruling moot). 
 116. See Rolex Watch USA v. Meece, 158 F.3d 816 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(refurbished Rolex watches with non-genuine parts); Martin’s Herend Imps., 
Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading USA, Co., 112 F.3d 1296 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(imported gray market Herendi porcelain which was identical to the original 
article); Levi Strauss & Co. v. Shilon, 121 F.3d 1309 (9th Cir. 1997) (look-a-like 
Levi jeans and counterfeit Levi tags and labels); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. 
Gen. Circuit Breaker & Elec. Supply, Inc., 106 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 1997) 
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cut examples of counterfeiting, they do not explicitly address the 
issue of whether a counterfeit mark must be placed on the goods.  
It is worth noting that not a single reported counterfeiting case 
supports the idea that use of a mark on invoices can be 
considered counterfeiting. 
Waco relied upon three cases to support its contention of the 
extension of the definition of counterfeiting.  First, Waco relied 
on the Speicher trilogy of cases involving “knock-off” General 
Electric carbon-alloy cutting inserts.117  The defendant in that 
case made copies of GE “carboloy 570” cutting inserts, which 
were put into authentic GE boxes marked as GE carboloy “570” 
cutting insert.118  In the first opinion, the Court determined that 
the knock-off cutting tools were not counterfeit because 
“Speicher did not copy the G.E. or Carboloy marks,” but rather 
“Speicher used actual G.E. boxes which carried the authentic 
G.E. trademarks.”119  Because the goods were not counterfeit, the 
court found the resulting ex parte seizure to be wrongful and 
awarded damages to Speicher.  In the second opinion, the court 
denied G.E.’s request for reconsideration. The court noted that 
G.E.’s seizure application requested the seizure of “all cutting 
inserts marked with the number ‘570’” and “all cutting inserts 
bearing reproductions of any of General Electric’s trademarks,” 
but no such cutting inserts were found or seized.120 
 
(refurbished Westinghouse circuit breakers sold with the original 
Westinghouse mark still attached); Intel Corp. v. Terebyte Int’l, Inc., 6 F.3d 
614 (9th Cir. 1993) (math coprocessor computer chips that had been relabeled 
to indicate that they were faster than they actually were); Vuitton v. White, 
945 F.2d 569 (3d Cir. 1991) (fake Louis Vuitton handbags bearing spurious 
Vuitton marks); Interstate Battery Sys. of Am., Inc. v. Wright, 811 F. Supp. 
237 (N.D. Tex. 1993) (plaintiff’s battery labels attached to batteries that were 
not genuine); Sports Design and Dev., Inc. v. Schoneboom, 871 F. Supp. 1158 
(N.D. Iowa 1995) (look-a-like fishing lures sold in boxes bearing plaintiff’s 
trademark); Reebok Int’l. Ltd. v. Marntech Enter., Inc., 737 F. Supp 1515 
(discussing jurisdiction), and 737 F. Supp. 1521 (S.D. Cal. 1989) (look-a-like 
Reebok shoes – complete with trademark stripes).  “When an original mark is 
attached to a product in such a way as to deceive the public, the product itself 
becomes a ‘counterfeit’ just as it would if an imitation of the mark were 
attached.”  Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 106 F.3d at 900. 
 117. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Speicher, 676 F. Supp. 1421 (N.D.Ind. 1988), 
reconsideration denied, 681 F. Supp. 1337 (N.D. Ind. 1988), rev’d 877 F.2d 531 
(7th Cir. 1989) (noting that a cutting insert is the cutting portion of a drill bit 
or saw). 
 118. Speicher, 877 F.2d. at 533.  Evidence and testimony conflicted 
regarding whether Speicher put to tools into the GE boxes, or if that was done 
by the distributor.  See id. 
 119. Speicher, 676 F. Supp. at 1428 (emphasis in original). 
 120. Speicher, 681 F. Supp. at 1338. 
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The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Posner, 
disagreed with the trial court’s interpretation of the term 
“counterfeiting,” stating that the lower court’s literal 
interpretation of counterfeiting 
might be the correct one if section 1114(1)(a) was aimed just at 
‘counterfeiting.’ But as the words ‘reproduction,’ ‘copy,’ and 
‘colorable imitation’ suggest more clearly than ‘counterfeiting,’ the 
aim is broader: to prohibit the use of your trademark on someone 
else’s product without your authorization.  The usual violator of 
this prohibition copies, reproduces, imitates – or if you will 
‘counterfeits’ – the trademark.121 
The court then held that Speicher’s use of the genuine GE 
trademarks on the boxes constituted counterfeiting. 
 We can see no difference, so far as the objectives of section 
1114(1)(a) are concerned, between doing this and making a 
reproduction of GE’s trademark.  The happenstance of having 
trademarks made by the owner in one’s possession, so that one 
doesn’t have to copy them, has no relevance to the purposes of the 
statute. . . . The more fundamental point is that the purpose of 
trademark law is not to guarantee genuine trademarks but to 
guarantee that every item sold under a trademark is the genuine 
trademarked product, not a substitute.122 
This statement could be interpreted to support either a 
broad interpretation of counterfeiting (as Waco argued) or a 
narrow interpretation of counterfeiting (as KHK argued).  The 
Seventh Circuit opinion can be broadly interpreted to stand for 
the proposition that an item placed in a box bearing a spurious 
trademark can be considered a counterfeit: “The more 
fundamental point is that the purpose of trademark law is not to 
guarantee genuine trademarks but to guarantee that every item 
sold under a trademark is the genuine trademarked product.”123  
But it can also be fairly read to stand for the proposition that 
this activity is merely trademark infringement under section 
1114(1): “the aim [of section 1114(1)] is broader: to prohibit the 
use of your trademark on someone else’s product without your 
authorization.”124  Because of this inconsistency, this decision 
provides little assistance for our definitional inquiry. 
 
 121. Speicher, 877 F.2d at 534 (citing Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Pin Yang Lee, 
875 F.2d 584 (7th  Cir. 1989)). 
 122. Id. (citing Fendi S.A.S. de Paola Fendi e Sorelle v. Cosmetic World, 
Ltd., 642 F. Supp. 1143 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
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Second, Waco relied on Pepe (U.K.) Ltd. v. Ocean View 
Factory Outlet Corp.125 in an attempt to stretch the 
interpretation of counterfeiting somewhat, but again in a way 
that helps neither a broad nor a narrow definition of 
counterfeiting.  Pepe involved a creative counterfeiter who 
produced and sold T-shirts bearing variations of the registered 
Pepe trademarks that were neither “identical with, or 
substantially indistinguishable from”126 the registered mark.  
Pepe obtained an ex parte seizure under 15 U.S.C. §1116(d), 
which the defendant claimed was wrongful because the marks 
were not counterfeit.127  The district court determined that the 
knock-off shirts were indeed counterfeit, and quoted the 
legislative history for the seizure statute to the effect that “a 
mark need not be absolutely identical to a genuine mark in 
order to be considered ‘counterfeit.’ Such an interpretation 
would allow counterfeiters to escape liability by modifying the 
registered trademarks of their honest competitors in trivial 
ways.”128  The facts of the case support the contention that the 
spurious mark must be on the goods, but also supports the 
extension of seizures to goods other than those bearing 
“identical or . . . substantially indistinguishable” marks. 
Third, Waco relied on Levi Strauss & Co. v. Shilon,129 which 
proved equally unhelpful.  This case involved the offering for 
sale of “knock-off” Levi jeans with counterfeit Levi tags and 
labels.130  The defendant had offered counterfeit jeans and labels 
to an investigator for Levi, but did not have the products in his 
possession: he would deliver them from a factory in Mexico once 
the sale was made.  Levi was not able to obtain a seizure order 
under the customs laws because it lacked actual counterfeits, so 
it brought suit under the Lanham Act instead.131  The defendant 
claimed he could not be liable for counterfeiting under 15 U.S.C. 
§1114 because he did not have possession of the counterfeit 
goods.132  The court dismissed this argument, noting that the 
infringement section applies equally to “offering for sale” 
 
 125. 770 F. Supp. 754 (D. Puerto Rico 1991). 
 126. See 15 U.S.C. §1127 (2001) (defining a “counterfeit” mark as “a 
spurious mark which is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, 
a registered mark” (emphasis added)). 
 127. See Pepe, 770 F. Supp. at 756-57. 
 128. Id. at 758 (citing 130 Cong.Rec. H12078 (Daily Ed. Oct. 10, 1983). 
   129.  121 F.3d 1309 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 130. See id. 
 131.  See 19 U.S.C. § 1526. 
 132. Levi Strauss & Co., 121 F.3d at 1311. 
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infringing goods.133  Neither the court nor the defendant 
addressed the question of whether the separation of the goods 
from the labels made the jeans counterfeit.  However, the facts 
of this case support the contention that a product can be 
counterfeit where the spurious marks are provided separate 
from the goods the court did not state this directly. 
Clearly, neither statutory construction nor case law support 
Waco’s definition of counterfeiting.  It is reassuring to note that 
common sense also cuts against Waco’s interpretation of 
counterfeiting.  Under Waco’s definition of counterfeiting, 
virtually all allegations of passing off would constitute 
counterfeiting. 
It should also be noted that trademark law in general 
requires use of marks on goods, where the nature of the goods 
allows.  It is a fundamental feature of trademark law that 
“trademark use” requires (if the nature of the goods allow) 
affixation of the mark on the goods.  “Because the value of a 
trademark arises from its association with goods of a particular 
quality and source, a trademark comes into existence only once 
it is affixed to goods in commerce.”134  This comports with the 
statutory requirements for use of the mark on the goods as set 
forth above.  Because of this provision, courts have held that use 
of the mark on invoices was insufficient to show use.135 
Based on this analysis, the goods sold by KHK were clearly 
not counterfeit.  The court was, therefore, correct in determining 
that the seizure was wrongful.  The court and jury also 
determined that the seizure was sought, obtained, or conducted 
in bad faith.  Waco’s conduct in the case will be scrutinized to 
determine what conduct constituted bad faith behavior. 
 
B.  VERIFIED COMPLAINT 
 
The Seizure Statute sets out three subsections that detail 
the legal and factual information required in the application.  
The statute specifically requires that the “application for an 
order under this subsection shall be based on an affidavit or the 
verified complaint establishing facts sufficient to support the 
 
 133. See id. at 1312. 
 134. Liebowitz v. Elsevier Sci. Ltd., 927 F. Supp. 688, 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(citing United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97-98 (1918)). 
 135. See S Indus., Inc. v. Stone Age Equip. Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d. 796 (N.D. 
Ill. 1998); see also In re Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co., 455 F.2d 563 (C.C.P.A. 
1972); In re Dura Corp., 188 U.S.P.Q. 701 (P.T.O. T.T.A.B. 1975). 
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findings of fact and conclusions of law required for such order.”136  
Commentators have noted that in the ex parte seizure 
application process, “complete candor with the court is Rule 
One.”137  In fact, the legislative history addresses this issue:  in 
an ex parte proceeding, the court will have no choice but to rely 
on the representations of the applicant.138 
Additionally, one of the few reported seizure cases 
specifically addressed this issue.  In Super Power Supply, Inc. v. 
Macase Indus. Corp. the plaintiff’s counsel told the court that 
the defendant’s goods were counterfeit when in fact the 
defendant was a disgruntled former distributor for the 
plaintiff.139  The court stated that where “such extraordinary 
relief as an unnoticed, ex parte seizure order is sought, the Court 
necessarily relies upon the diligence, honesty, and 
forthrightness of the represented party’s counsel to ensure that 
the rights of the unrepresented party are not unduly 
infringed.”140 The court granted sanctions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 
against the plaintiff’s counsel because (1) he “should have 
known after a reasonable investigation of the facts that he 
had . . . no basis whatsoever upon which to seek unnoticed, ex 
parte relief;”141 (2) he “intentionally misrepresented certain facts 
to the Court;”142 and (3) he “was dilatory in rectifying his 
mistakes and omissions once they were made known to him.”143 
These holdings are particularly relevant here.  Because the 
court was relying on Waco’s factual and legal representations in 
granting the seizure order, Waco owed the court (and ultimately 
KHK) a duty to submit a seizure order that was consistent with 
the statutory requirements, prior legal precedent, and the facts 
Waco knew to be true.  Despite this, Waco’s attorney candidly 
admitted at trial that she saw herself not as an officer of the 
court, but as an advocate for her client’s interests.  At trial, 
Waco’s attorney144 was questioned about her actions in obtaining 
 
 136. 15 U.S.C. §1116(d)(3) (2000). 
 137. TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING, supra note 7, at 16. 
 138. See Joint Statement on Trademark Counterfeiting Legislation, 130 
CONG. REC. 31673 (1984), at 12080. 
 139.  See Super Power Supply, Inc. v. Macase Indus. Corp., 154 F.R.D. 249, 249 (C.D. 
Cal. 1994). 
 140. Id. at 256. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Though from the same law firm, the attorney that obtained the seizure 
order did not participate in the trial in front of the jury.  She did sit at the table 
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the ex parte seizure application: 
Q: Do you understand what the duty of candor is? 
A: To be candid with the court when you make an application 
to the Court.  Is that what you are referring to? 
Q: Yes.  Because you are an officer of the court.  Is that 
correct? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Okay.  And you’re also an advocate for your client.  Is that 
correct? 
A: That’s right. 
Q: And at some times – those two duties that you have 
sometimes conflict.  Isn’t that correct? 
A: I suppose they might. . . . 
Q: Do you think that that was an – you were being an 
advocate for your client at that point or were you being more an 
officet of the court when you explained what kind of seizure 
application you were looking for? 
   A: I was an advocate for the client, sir.145 
Waco made a number of misrepresentations in its 
application for seizure.  First, Waco misrepresented the facts 
regarding the marks on the scaffolding.  Not only did Waco 
obfuscate the fact that there were no “WACO” marks on the 
KHK scaffolding, they ignored the fact that the KHK name was 
on KHK’s scaffolding.  Waco’s investigator, Robert Hardcastle, 
in a declaration attached to Plaintiff’s Original Verified 
Complaint stated that, based on his personal knowledge, the 
scaffolding frames at the premises of KHK were not marked in 
any way with their source or place of origin.146  Upon later cross-
examination – at the preliminary injunction hearing – Mr. 
Hardcastle admitted that he had not looked closely at the safety 
sticker listing KHK’s name and phone number (which were 
attached to the frames he purchased) prior to the seizure.147 
Waco also claimed that it had “exclusive rights to the color 
red or the color blue on scaffolds and shores,”148 and stated that 
 
and participated in drafting the jury charge and questions. 
 145. Waco Int’l, Inc. v. KHK Scaffolding, et al., C.A. No. H-98-1309, (Trial 
Transcript, pp. 433 - 435 (June 19, 2000)). 
 146. See id. (Plaintiff’s Original Verified Complaint, Exhibit G (Docket 
Entry No. 5)). 
 147. See id. (Transcript of June 8, 1998 Preliminary Injunction Hearing, pp. 
101-102). 
 148. Id. (Plaintiff’s Original Verified Complaint, ¶ 13). 
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it had used the color red exclusively for fifty years.149  Waco later 
admitted that both statements were false.  In response to a 
Request for Admission, Waco admitted that, on April 30, 1998 
(the date the Complaint and Application for Seizure were filed) 
“it knew that Vanguard used a dark blue color for its scaffolding 
products and that it did not advise the Court of that 
knowledge.”150  The admission then attempts to distinguish the 
shades of the color blue as used by Waco and Vanguard, but the 
Complaint and Application for Seizure did not specify shade and 
requested the seizure of any blue scaffolding.151 
In a second Request for Admission, Waco admitted that its 
Executive Vice President, Marty Coughlin, was aware, 
“beginning about three or four years prior to the filing of this 
suit, that A-1 Plank and Scaffolding Company would 
manufacture a product and would paint it red pursuant to a 
customer request.”152  Waco again attempted to distinguish the 
shade of the color red used by Waco and A-1, but the Complaint 
and the Application for Seizure did not specify a shade of red.  
Additionally, Waco’s President, George Malley,153 and Vice 
President, Marty Coughlin,154 both admitted in court that other 
companies paint scaffolding red, and there is nothing that Waco 
can do about it.  Clearly Waco did not have the “exclusive use” of 
the colors red or blue, and therefore, it misled the court in its 
Verified Complaint. 
Additionally, Waco misled the Court regarding the nature of 
KHK’s business.  One requirement for obtaining a seizure is to 
show that the alleged “counterfeiter” would destroy the evidence 
of his misdeeds if given notice of a lawsuit.155  Courts, and the 
 
 149. See id. at paragraph 15. 
 150. Id. (Waco’s Response to KHK’s 1st Req. For Admission, Request No. 
24). 
 151. Despite this admission, Waco did not drop its claims to blue until well 
into the trial.  At the first charge conference the Judge asked Waco about an 
infringement question concerning red and blue scaffolding.  He noted that 
Waco had not presented any evidence concerning blue scaffolding, and asked if 
they planned to do so.  At that point Waco’s attorney dropped all claims 
relating to blue. 
 152. Waco Int'l, Inc. v. KHK Scaffolding, et al., C.A. No. H-98-1309, (Waco’s 
Response to KHK’s 1st Req. For Admission, Request No. 20). 
 153. Id. (Testimony of George Malley, Trial Transcript, pp. 730, (June 20, 
2000)). 
 154. Id. (Testimony of Marty Coughlin, Trial Transcript, pp. 136 – 137, 
(June 15, 2000)). 
 155. See 15 U.S.C. §1116(d)(4)(B) (2000).  “The court shall not grant such an 
application unless . . . the person against whom seizure would be ordered, or 
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legislative history, state that this type of behavior generally 
applies only to “fly-by-night” operators, and presumptively does 
not apply to legitimate businesses.156  In its seizure application, 
Waco glossed over the fact that KHK had a permanent facility in 
Houston with over three million dollars in inventory on the lot.  
Given this investment, it would be highly unlikely that KHK 
would destroy or abandon its facility simply to avoid a lawsuit.  
Instead, Waco made the conclusory accusation that KHK would 
destroy evidence. 
Finally, Waco had the opportunity (and perhaps a duty) to 
amend its complaint to conform to the facts, as they became 
known.  Waco’s failure to do so could also constitute bad faith, 
and in fact both the legislative history and Super Case v. Macase 
(discussed above), support this contention.  The legislative 
history states “should the plaintiff learn as a result of discovery 
that any claim of counterfeiting is meritless, continued pursuit 




Another important element in obtaining a seizure is that 
the applicant posts bond “adequate . . . for the payment of such 
damages as any person may be entitled to recover as a result of 
a wrongful seizure.”158  Congress described the security 
requirement as “the heart of the ex parte seizure provisions,”159 
and noted that the “provision of a bond is one of the critical 
procedural protections designed to ensure that the defendant’s 
rights are adequately protected during the course of an ex parte 
 
persons acting in concert with such person, would destroy, move, hide, or 
otherwise make such matters inaccessible to the court, if the applicant were to 
proceed on notice to such person.”  Id. 
 156. See Joint Statement on Trademark Counterfeiting Legislation, 130 
CONG. REC. 31673 (1984), at 12081.  H12081, ¶ 7 states: 
A reputable businessperson would not be likely to conceal or 
destroy evidence when notified of a pending lawsuit, and the 
issuance of an ex parte seizure order against such a person would 
therefore be wholly inappropriate . . . . Rather, the sponsors 
believe that ex parte seizures are a necessary tool to thwart the 
bad faith efforts of fly by night defendants to evade the 
jurisdiction of the court. 
Id. 
 157. S. REP. NO. 98-526, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3627, at 19. 
 158. 15 U.S.C. §1116(d)(4)(A). 
 159. See 130 CONG. REC. 31673 (1984), at 12080. (“This subsection is the 
heart of the ex parte seizure provisions.”) 
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seizure.”160 
On May 5, 1998, after obtaining the seizure order and 
immediately before proceeding with the seizure, Waco filed an 
indemnity bond in the amount of $25,000.  In determining the 
amount of the bond, Waco’s attorney’s made no attempt to 
determine the effect of a seizure on a scaffolding business like 
KHK’s. At trial, Waco’s attorney candidly admitted that the 
amount of the bond was based on a seizure of counterfeit Gucci 
handbags that she had conducted fifteen years before. 
Q: Okay. Well, how did you arrive at [$]25,000? 
A: It was just the number I used in the past of other seizures 
– that I think we used in the Gucci case. 
Q: So, it had no relationship to the actual value of the goods 
that you were going to go out and seize.  Is that correct? 
A: That’s correct.161 
The bond, therefore, was grossly inadequate to compensate 
KHK in the event that the seizure went wrong.  The bond was 
also titled an “Injunction Bond” and was specifically for damages 
that KHK Scaffolding Houston, Inc. “may sustain by reason of 
the Injunction order in this action, if it be finally decided that 
the said Preliminary Injunction order in this action ought not 
have been granted.”  There was no reference whatsoever in the 
bond to the Seizure Order or to coverage for Waco’s liability for 
damages for the specifically enumerated cause of action for 
“wrongful seizure” set out in 15 U.S.C. §1116(d)(11).  The bond 
was, therefore, most likely defective on its face.  Taken together, 
these two facts indicate that Waco was not concerned about the 
bond – it was merely a step to be taken – and not the vital 
protection that Congress presumed. 
 
D. GOODS TO BE SEIZED AND THE LOCATION 
 
The seizure statute requires that the seizure order set forth 
“a particular description of the matter to be seized.”162  This 
section, as mentioned previously, is designed to prevent broad-
based searches that would violate a defendants Fourth 
Amendment rights.  As the Supreme Court stated regarding the 
specificity requirement: “the requirement ensures that the 
 
 160. Id. 
 161. Waco Int’l, Inc. v. KHK Scaffolding, et al., C.A. No. H-98-1309, (Trial 
Testimony, p. 441). 
 162. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(5)(b). 
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search will be carefully tailored to its justification, and will not 
take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches 
the Framers intended to prohibit.”163  Despite this requirement 
of specificity, the seizure order in this case allowed for the 
seizure of “all scaffolding and shoring frames and parts bearing 
the paint color red and the paint color blue” located at KHK’s 
Houston facility.164  Pursuant to this order, Waco’s attorneys and 
two United States Marshals entered KHK’s facility and 
impounded all red and blue scaffolding, and most of KHK’s 
business records.165 
Evidence at trial indicated that a total of 7525 pieces of 
frame scaffolding were seized by placing yellow police tape on 
and around stacks of frames in KHK’s yard.  The seized 
scaffolding included 600 red 5’x6’7” walk through frames (which 
KHK referred to as “Waco Style” frames), 3400 red shoring 
frames, 1925 blue 5’x6’4” walk through frames (which KHK 
referred to as “Safway Style” frames166), and 1600 blue “Safway 
Style” mason frames.167 
Both red and blue goods were seized despite the fact that 
Waco knew that KHK did not stock any blue Waco compatible 
scaffolding frames.  When Waco’s investigator went to KHK to 
purchase scaffolding that Waco feared KHK was selling as 
“Waco” scaffolding, the salesman told him that there was no WB 
(or “Waco Blue” style) scaffolding in stock.  Despite its failure to 
obtain or verify that KHK was selling, or even possessed, “Waco 
Blue” scaffolding, Waco obtained a seizure for, and actually 
seized, 3525 blue “Safway style” scaffolding frames. 
At trial, Waco’s attorney seemed unconcerned by this: 
Q: And when he [Waco’s investigator] asked for WB frames, 
he was told that there weren’t any WB frames.  Correct? 
A: That’s right. 
Q: So, when you went in for the seizure application, you had 
 
 163. Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. Jane Does # 1-2 and John Does # 1-10, 876 
F. Supp. 407, 413 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (quoting Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 
84 (1987). 
 164. Waco Int’l, Inc., C.A. No. H-98-1309, (Order of Seizure of Goods Being 
Offered and Sold Under Counterfeit Registered Trademark Pursuant to 15 
U.S.C. §1116(d)(1)(A), paragraph 2). 
 165. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Speicher, 877 F.2d 531, 538 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(indicating cases allow the seizure of business records). 
 166. Safway sells its frames in gray, not blue.  See Waco International, Inc., 
C.A. No. H-98-1309, (Plaintiff Trial Exhibit 131, “Safway Catalogue”). 
 167. Waco Int’l, Inc., C.A. No. H-98-1309, (Plaintiff Trial Exhibit 74, 
“Inventory”). 
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no earthly idea what WB frames looked like, did you? 
A: You’re correct. 
Q: But, still, you went forward with the idea that blue frames 
were to be seized because they were counterfeit of Waco’s frames.  
Is that correct? 
A: The blue frames were seized because they [KHK] were 
offering Waco Blue. 
Q: But you never purchased any. 
A: That’s correct.168 
The legislative history notes that “the mere fact that a few 
legitimate items may have been seized does not make the 
seizure as a whole wrongful; otherwise, a counterfeiter could 
ensure that any seizure of its counterfeit merchandise would be 
“wrongful” simply by mingling a few genuine items with [the] 
inventory of fakes.”169 Here (even assuming Waco’s 
interpretation of counterfeiting and broadly granting it rights to 
all red scaffolding) almost half the goods seized were legitimate.  
This far exceeds the “mingling of a few genuine items” 
mentioned in the legislative history. 
It should also be noted that Waco had the opportunity to 
inspect the blue scaffolding to determine if it was “Waco Blue” 
style scaffolding, and did not.  In fact, Waco never proved that 
KHK ever sold “Waco Blue” style scaffolding.  Waco was unable 
to prove this because KHK never did sell that particular style of 
scaffolding.  Despite the complete lack of evidence to support 
this claim, Waco pursued claims based on the color blue until 
the charge conference at trial. 
It is not possible to determine directly from the jury’s 
verdict what specific factor or factors they considered in finding 
that the seizure was in bad faith.  It may have been that fact 
that Waco’s legal claims of counterfeiting were entirely baseless.  
It may have been the fact that Waco made numerous 
misrepresentations in its application for the seizure order, or 
posted a bond grossly inadequate to compensate KHK and, 
amusingly enough, based on the value of counterfeit handbags.  
It may have been that Waco obtained a broad-based seizure that 
effectively allowed it to shut down a competitor.  Most likely the 
jury determined that, taken together, all of these evidenced a 
complete disregard for KHK’s rights and the legal requirements 
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The seizure of goods is an important tool in fighting 
trademark counterfeiting.  Unfortunately, if mishandled, a 
seizure can turn around to hurt the owner of the trademark, as 
illustrated by Waco International v. KHK Scaffolding, et al.  An 
attorney considering an application for a seizure should take 
heed of Waco’s errors and remember that the purpose of the 
seizure statute checklist is not only to protect a defendant, but 
also to protect the applicant from paying for a wrongful seizure. 
